Abstract. Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks have plagued the Internet for many years. We propose a system to defend against DDoS attacks in a non-cooperative environment, where upstream intermediate networks need to be given an economic incentive in order for them to cooperate in the attack mitigation. Lack of such incentives is a root cause for the rare deployment of distributed DDoS mitigation schemes. Our system is based on game-theoretic principles that provably provide incentives to each participating AS (Autonomous Systems) to report its true defense costs to the victim, which computes and compensates the most cost-efficient (yet still effective) set of defenders ASs. We also present simulation results with real AS-level topologies to demonstrate the economic feasibility of our approach.
Introduction
The distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is a formidable problem that has plagued the Internet for many years. The intent of such attacks is to exhaust the resources of a remote host or network such that the service provided to legitimate users is degraded or denied. As a response to the serious threat posed by DDoS attacks, a plethora of target-resident DDoS mitigation techniques have been proposed, including packet filtering, anti-spoofing, anomaly detection, protocol analysis, and rate limiting. Albeit commercial products providing these solutions are available, it is still a challenging undertaking for the victim to successfully defend against a large-scale DDoS attack all by itself. The reasons are two-fold. First, although the victim is at the best position to detect a DDoS attack, distinguishing traffic with good and ill intentions is not easy. A smart attacker can complicate the defense by making the attack traffic behave similar to legitimate traffic. Second, even if the victim has the perfect technology to characterize malicious traffic, it may not have the computational resources to execute it at the same speed as the arriving attack traffic. This turns the DDoS mitigation component itself into a target of a DDoS attack.
Some earlier work has suggested pushing the perimeter of DDoS defense to intermediate networks [16] . None of these techniques, however, are widely deployed, due to lack of economic and social incentives for the intermediate networks [14] . In many cases, intermediate networks do not suffer directly from a DDoS attack, and are thus reluctant to devote a non-trivial amount of resources to help the victim. Even during some flooding DDoS attacks in which traffic traversing through these networks increases significantly, bandwidth overprovision prepared for flash crowds helps them absorb such types of attacks.
Motivated by this observation, we develop an economically sound framework that mitigates DDoS attacks in non-cooperative environments. We assume that intermediate networks (or ASs) are selfish, and they are willing to defend against the DDoS attack for the victim only when they receive enough economic compensation. Put in a game theoretic context, the distributed DDoS mitigation problem triggers the following questions: What ASs should be selected for defending 
against the attack ? How much should the victim pay to each participating AS for the defense? How can we design a protocol that stimulates each AS to truthfully report its real cost on the defense other than an arbitrarily high value without economic basis? Can the victim impose a limit on how much money it is willing to pay for the defense in the protocol ?
Our approach to addressing these questions in an economically and gametheoretically sound manner, is as follows: Using a combination of established tools to compute DDoS attack graphs, we make ASs on attack paths report defense cost estimates. Based on these estimates, we compute the most costefficient set of defender ASs. Using the game-theoretic paradigm of VCG-type payment schemes ensures that each defense participant maximizes its own utility but truthfully reporting its real cost estimate. In the parlance of game theory, our protocols are provably truthful and also satisfy individual rationality. We evaluate our protocol on a real Internet-scale AS-level topology. Experimental results reveal that under DDoS attacks launched from botnets of typical sizes observed so far, the inevitable economic inefficiency of our protocol is limited within only 20% of the total payment to the participating defenders if the deployment ratio of the distributed defense scheme reaches 60%.
Related work. The concept of game theory, especially mechanism design, has been used in routing protocol design for communication networks, such as interdomain routing [9] and Ad hoc-VCG for mobile ad-hoc networks [5] . On the other hand, Mirkovic et al. presented a comprehensive survey on solutions to defending against DDoS attacks in [14] . Huang et al. suggested that currently providing incentives for participating parties in the DDoS defense should be given higher priority than improving the defense technology [11] . Their arguments are in agreement with the motivation behind this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how the victim constructs the defense graph. Section 3 presents how to select defender ASs. Sections 4 and 5 introduce the payment schemes. Section 6 evaluates the economic inefficiency and Section 7 concludes this paper.
Defense Graph Generation
We consider an attack model in which many compromised hosts are used to launch a large-scale DDoS attack against a server providing a network-accessible service, such as online banking, online game, or database query. As the network and computation resources (e.g., bandwidth, CPUs, storage, software licenses) supporting these services are usually limited, an attacker can convene a large army of zombie machines (e.g., using a botnet) to deplete these resources and thus significantly degrade the QoS (Quality of Services) experienced by legitimate clients. We do not assume that the victim can always easily distinguish malicious traffic from benign traffic. A smart attacker can make the malicious traffic behave similar to that from a legitimate user. We assume that to achieve this, the attacker has to use real source IP addresses in his attack traffic 1 . Our work requires that the defense graph is constructed at the victim site. To do this, we leverage existing tools and methods as follows. First, when the target server becomes overloaded, incoming source IP addresses are randomly sampled. For each sampled packet, we use the network-aware clustering technique described in [12] to derive its origin AS. It has been shown that this method is able to cluster 99% of the web clients. For each clustered IP prefix, we can look up its corresponding AS number from a map, which can be constructed offline or obtained from a third party such as Team Cymru [1] . Second, the victim decides V or , the set of origin ASs from which traffic should be inspected based on the traffic rate from each AS and how much the current traffic rate from an AS exceeds the average traffic rate observed in the past. Third, the victim infers AS-level paths from ASs in V or to the victim network using tools such as RouteScope [13] . Combining all the AS-level paths inferred from ASs in V or to the victim network, the victim can build the defense graph G(V, E), in which nodes are denoted by A 1 , A 2 , ..., and A |V | .
The aforementioned approach to constructing defense graphs differs from existing solutions to attack graph generation [16] that use the probabilistic packet marking (PPM) scheme. PPM, which requires intermediate routers to mark traversing packets probabilistically, has a few drawbacks here. First, it is not immune to edge faking, standard IP stack attack, and near-birthday collision attack [19] . Second, intermediate routers can erase marks inscribed by upstream ones to increase its chance being selected as a defender. Third, deriving a complete attack graph at the victim site requires all ASs to perform PPM, which is difficult from a deployment point of view.
After constructing the defense graph, the victim does the following: (1) contact the defense proxy (explained later) of each AS in the defense graph, querying the defense price if that defense proxy deploys the defense scheme requested by the victim; (2) select the most cost efficient set of ASs; (3) calculate the payment made to the owner of each AS that is selected for distributed defense; (4) send the payment to the owner of each AS selected for distributed defense.
Once an AS that is selected for distributed defense receives the payment, it forwards all traffic destined to the target server to the defense proxy. A defense proxy performs requested defense action by the victim such as packet filtering and anti-spoofing. To alleviate the high workload on the server, the victim can even delegate part of its service to the defense proxies. In the following sections, we explain the details of Steps (1) through (4).
Defender Selection

Phase I: Requesting Defense Costs
After constructing the defense graph, the victim sends a request to each AS in it, asking distributed defense against the DDoS attack. We assume that an AS can forward its traffic to its defense proxy, if it has one, at two places: links connected to end hosts in its local administrative domain, and outbound links to other ASs (if the victim does not belong to the AS) or links directly connected to the victim (if the victim belongs to the AS). We use L loc (k) and L out (k) to denote these two sets of links in AS A k respectively. We also assume that DDoS attack traffic originates only from end hosts. For ease of presentation, we let v denote the address of the target server. If AS A k forwards traffic with destination v to its defense proxy on links in L out (k), it does not need to do it on links in L loc (k), because any locally generated traffic with destination v, if not dropped inside AS A k , must traverse some link in L out (k) before reaching the victim network.
Each AS A k in set V or under request calculates two costs: one is associated with forwarding traffic with destination v from links in L loc (k) to its defense proxy and then performing requested action on the traffic there, and the other associated with forwarding traffic with destination v from links in L out (k) to its defense proxy and then performing requested action on the traffic there. Let C loc (k) and C out (k) denote these two costs respectively. If AS A k is in set V − V or , it only computes C out (k) and its C loc (k) is automatically 0. In cases that AS A k does not have a defense proxy, both its C out (k) and C loc (k) are +∞. We further define C(k) as a 2-tuple vector: C loc (k), C out (k) , and call it the genuine cost vector of AS A k . C(k) is private information owned by AS A k , and in the parlance of game theory, it is called the type of AS A k .
Here, we do not impose specific formula on how each AS should compute its genuine cost vector. Actually, such estimated costs rely on many factors such as performance degradation due to requested defense and the service level agreements (SLAs) between the AS and its customers. Instead, our protocol only assumes the existence of such costs and it works independently of how ASs estimate these costs. Moreover, we also assume that such cost estimation can be done quickly (e.g., performed automatically without human intervention) by each AS. We will explore how to achieve this in our future work.
Meanwhile, each AS A k is requested to report its genuine cost vector to the victim. As an AS may lie about its true costs, we use R loc (k) and R out (k) to denote the two reported costs respectively. Similarly, we define, R(k), the reported cost vector of AS A k , as 2-tuple vector:
Phase II: Computing Defense Set
After the victim receives all the reported cost vectors from the ASs in the defense graph, it decides which ASs should be selected for defending against the DDoS attack. Recall that an AS A k can perform the requested action on traffic going through links in either L loc (k) or L out (k). Hence, the victim should also determine traffic on which links an AS, if selected for defense, should check according to the requested action. Define a defense set D as a set of 2-tuple A i , p i , where
, a set of network links, as follows:
In other words, set Γ (D) consists of all the links on which traffic is inspected under defense set D. We use P (q) to denote the set of links on the path of packet q. We define the completeness of defense set D as follows:
Definition 1. Defense set D is complete relative to AS set S if for any packet q that originates from an AS in S and goes to the target server, there exists a link l in
From the economic point of view, it is reasonable to assume that the victim wants to find the most cost-efficient defense set that is also complete. Given a defense set D, we define its cost H(D) as follows:
We further give the following definition:
Definition 2. A defense set D that is complete relative to AS set S is efficient relative to the reported costs if for any other defense D that is also complete relative to AS set S, it holds H(D ) ≥ H(D).
We now present an algorithm that computes a defense set that is complete relative to a subset of V or and efficient relative to the reported costs. D min is initialized to be empty. The algorithm consists of two steps:
Step 1: generate mutated defense graph G m . We first create a new graph A −1 and a directed edge with weight ∞ to every node A l i with upper index l in G m whose corresponding AS node A i is in set V or . In G m , we call a node with upper index i an i-type node, a node with upper index o an o-type node, and a node with upper index l an l-type node. Similarly, we call an edge from an i-type node to an o-type node an i-o-type edge, an edge from an l-type node to an i-type node an l-i-type edge, and an edge from an o-type node to an i-type node an o-l-type edge. In Fig. 1 , we illustrate the mutated defense graph generated from an defense graph and the reported costs from each AS. Step 2: compute the min-cut of G m . We treat the mutated defense graph as a flow network with source A −1 and sink v; the weight of each directed link is its capacity. It is possible that on some paths from A −1 to v all the edges have infinite weights; this occurs when no ASs on these paths deploy defense proxies. We preprocess G m as follows: use the DFS (Depth First Search) algorithm to traverse graph G m by starting from sink v and traversing the graph only along edges with infinite weights in reverse direction; whenever an l-type node u is visited, we add its corresponding AS node A k to set U and also erase the l-i-type edge associated with it from G m . It is not difficult to see that after preprocessing G m as described, G m must have a min-cut with a finite capacity. The celebrated max-flow min-cut theorem [6] states that the maximal amount of a flow is equal to the capacity of a minimal cut. To compute the min-cut of G m , we first derive the maximum flow f max m in G m . Given the max-flow f max m , we can obtain set E mc , which contains all the cutting edges in G m that it saturates. Then, the min-cut of G m can be obtained by cutting all the edges in E mc .
Based on E mc , the victim can derive a defense set that is complete relative to AS set V or − U and efficient relative to the reported costs. As only l-i-type and i-o-type edges have finite capacities in G m , E mc contains only such edges. For each l-i-type edge (A Based on the property of the min-cut, we can easily establish the following theorem (proof omitted): Theorem 1. The defense set found by the algorithm as described is complete relative to set V or − U and efficient relative to the reported costs.
Payments without Reserve Price
In this section, we consider the cases in which the victim does not impose a constraint on how much money it is willing to pay for the defense. Such a constraint is sometimes called reserve price [7] . A naive payment scheme is that the victim pays every AS in the final defense set by its reported cost. However, in a non-cooperative computation environment, there is no reason to believe that each AS truthfully reports its true costs. To prevent cheating, we borrow the payment scheme from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms [5] .
We say that we disable AS node A k ∈ V from graph G m by doing the following: if edge (A ) ∈ E m , we set its capacity to be +∞. The new graph after disabling node
In other words, AS A k , if selected for defense, is paid by the difference between the cost of the most cost efficient defense set after A k is disabled and the cost of the most cost efficient defense set without its own reported cost.
From a practical point of view, there are two problems with the above payment scheme. First, an economic entity (e.g., a big ISP) can own multiple ASs and as the above payment scheme treats each AS as an agent in the game, multiple agents belonging to the same economic entity can collude to achieve better economic benefits. We thus call it the collusion attack problem. It is also well known that the VCG-type payment scheme does not prevent collusion attacks [?] . To solve this problem, we slightly modify the above payment scheme. We treat each independent economic entity as an agent. Let Φ denote the entire set of economic entities or agents involved in the distributed defense, and Ψ (s), where s ∈ Φ, to denote the set of ASs that agent s controls. We also use Υ (G m,−S ) to denote the capacity of the min-cut after disabling all the AS nodes in set S from graph G m . The total payment made to agent s is given as follows:
is the overpayment made to agent s (relative to its reported cost); it is also called the premium paid to agent s.
Second, after disabling all AS nodes belonging to an agent s, the min-cut Υ (G m,−Ψ (s) ) may become infinity. This means that the victim has to pay an infinite amount of money to agent s, which is obviously not realistic. We call it the monopolistic extortion problem. To circumvent it, we modify the mutated defense graph G m to satisfy the 1-agent resilience property: for any path from node A −1 to victim node v, there are at least two edges that have finite weights and the nodes they are incident to belong to different agents. To achieve this property, we simply remove the first l-i-type edge on every path that does not satisfy this condition and put the AS node associated with that edge into set U .
Following the example in Fig. 1 The utility of an agent is defined as the payment it receives from the victim less its true cost. Let u(s) be the utility of agent s. Following the same example, we have u(s 1 ) = 5, u(s 2 ) = 12, and u(s 3 ) = 0. In the parlance of game theory, our protocol is truthful (or strategyproof ) only if truth-telling is a dominant strategy for each participating agent; that is to say, if an agent wants to maximize its utility, it must report truthfully its genuine cost vector for each AS that it owns, independently of any other agent's report. The individual rationality of a protocol means that an agent participates in the game only when its utility after participation is as much as that without participation. We then have the following theorem (proof provided in Appendix A):
Theorem 2. If the victim does not have a reserve price and the protocol as described is executed, behaving truthfully is a dominant strategy and individually rational for any agent.
Payments with Reserve Price
In this section we consider a more realistic setting in which the victim specifies its reserver price, the maximum amount of money it wants to pay for the distributed defense. We use P r to denote the reserve price of the victim. P r is the type of the victim, and the utility of the victim is P r minus the total payments made by the victim. Let P d be the total payment made to all the agents owning ASs in D min . A naive solution to deciding whether a deal should be made between the victim and the agents owning ASs in D min is: If P r ≥ P d , the deal is made; otherwise, the deal fails. Although intuitively reasonable, such a decision rule can lead to cheating behavior by some agents. We use a simple example in Fig. 2 to illustrate that. Each AS belongs to a different agent. D min is { A 3 , 0 , A 4 , 0 , A 5 , 0 }. We thus have η(ω(A 3 )) = 12, η(ω(A 4 )) = 11, and η(ω(A 4 )) = 7. Since P d = 30 > 20, the defense deal cannot be made. Now suppose that A 3 reports its cost vector as 11, 12 instead of 6, 12 . Clearly, D min does not change. η(ω(A 3 )) = 12, η(ω(A 4 )) = 6, and η(ω(A 5 )) = 2. Hence, P d = 20 < 25, which makes the deal take place. The utility of A 3 changes from 0 to 6 after it cheats.
To solve this problem, we borrow the idea of global replacement from [7] . Define set Φ min as follows: As the victim is only willing to pay P
−mc d
, the budget is no balanced if P
In the example, the victim pays only P −mc d = 18 for the defense, but the total payment made to all the ASs is P d = 30 > 18. To overcome such a side effect, we introduce the central bank model [10] , in which each AS has a bank account at a central bank and the bank periodically credits or debit each agent to balance its budget for the differences between P
and P d . Such a central bank can be managed by a trusted authority, such as IANA, which allocates unused AS numbers in the Internet.
Theorem 3 establishes the truthfulness and individual rationality of the protocol when the victim has a reserve price (proof provided in [20] ): Theorem 3. If the victim has a reserve price and the protocol as described is executed, behaving truthfully is a dominant strategy and individually rational for both the victim and any participating agent.
Experiments
Setup. In our experiments, we use a real Internet topology derived from BGP routing table dump files. From a BGP RIB file downloaded from the Route Views Project [2], we extract 25,193 AS numbers. The size of each AS is roughly estimated by adding the number of IPv4 addresses covered by all the prefixes announced by it. We choose a server that resides in AS 18784 as the target of a DDoS attack. We use the AS path inference service provided by the BGPVista project [3] .To obtain a map from each AS to its corresponding economic entity, we collect the information of each AS from the FixedOrbit website [4] . If two ASs have close names, we assume that they belong to the same economic entity. We identify 23,075 agents, among which 99.77% have only one AS. To obtain a map from each AS to its corresponding economic entity, we collect the information of each AS from the FixedOrbit website [4] . If two ASs have close names, we assume that they belong to the same economic entity.
We also vary the sizes of the botnets that are used to launch a DDoS attack against the target server among 10 4 , 10 5 , and 10 6 . These values are based on the sizes of today's botnets [15] . For each bot, we let its sending rate be 130kbps, according to the survey from [17] . In the experiments, we assume that bots are uniformly distributed in the IPv4 addresses owned by all the ASs under consideration. Moreover, when selecting a list of ASs from which traffic should be inspected, we do not consider normal traffic in our experiments, because this does not keep us from explaining the basic principle of our protocol. Instead, when the DDoS traffic generated from an AS exceeds a certain threshold θ, this AS is added into set V or . We set θ to be 10Mbps. We assume that the genuine cost of an AS A k on inspecting traffic on links in either L loc (k) or L out (k) is a linear function of the traffic destined to the victim through these links:
where T v loc (k) and T v out (k) denote the total traffic rate destined to the victim v through links in L loc (k) and L out (k) respectively, coefficients a loc (k) and a out (k) are uniformly chosen between 10 −6 and 5 × 10 −6 , and constants b loc (k) and b out (k) are uniformly chosen between 100 and 500.
The reserve price of the victim P r is given by c v · T v , where c v is 10 −5 and T v is traffic arrival rate at the victim site. We vary the probability with which an agent deploys defense proxies among 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100%. If an agent is chosen to deploy defense proxies, every AS it owns has a defense proxy.
Results. Due to space limitation, we present only the experimental results with reserve prices here. We refer readers to [20] for results without reserve prices. Fig.  3 depicts the fraction of successful deals between the victim and the participating agents. We note that as more agents deploy defense proxies, it is more likely that the distributed defense takes place. This is because with wider defense proxy deployment, there are more choices for the global replacement defense set, which helps reduce P
−mc d
. From the economic point of view, it is interesting to know how much the victim needs to overpay the participating agents so that the latter do not cheat. Among the successful deals between the victim and the participating agents, the overpayment ratio is illustrated in Fig. 4 . The overpayment ratio is defined as
, where P d is the total payment made to all participating defenders and Y is the true total defense cost incurred by them. The general trend of each curve is that as more agents deploy defense proxies, the overpayment ratio decreases. This is because a higher portion of agents with defense proxies provides more options if a participating agent is disabled from the mutated defense graph, which helps reduce the premium made to that agent. Although the overpayment can be very high, the victim does not need to pay as much to the participating agents because of its reserve price. Fig. 5 presents the overpayment ratio that is contributed only by the victim: the largest average overpayment ratio by the victim is 0.83, much less than the highest overall overpayment ratio (about 100).
The economic model incorporating the victim's reserve price requires a central bank to pay the overpayment that is not contributed by the victim. To balance its own budget, the central bank can impose a tax upon the agents [10] . Fig. 6 depicts the budget balance, defined as (P d − P
)/P d . The graph suggests that when there are not many agents deploying defense proxies and the DDoS attack is launched from a million-host botnet, the budget balance of the central bank can be as high as 70% of the total payment. However, million-host botnets are still rare so far [15] , and for smaller botnets, if at least 60% of the agents deploy defense proxies, the average budget balance is below 20%.
Conclusion
Our work in this paper is motivated by the observation that lack of social or economic incentive is one of the root causes that no distributed defense scheme has been widely deployed against DDoS attacks. Assuming that autonomous systems behave selfishly in defending against DDoS attacks, we propose a protocol that provides incentives for these ASs to participate in cooperative defense. Our protocol is provably truthful and also satisfies individual rationality.
